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The green economy is an emergent approach to sustainable development launched at 
Rio+20. Herein environmental decision-making is increasingly achieved through 
economistic processes and logic. The natural commons is quantified and managed as 
natural capital. This paper summarizes the trajectory of the project and its ideological 
framework. It examines various conceptualizations of economic approaches to the 
environment and considers philosophical, methodological and political problems 
associated with the green economy project. In the face of very different definitions of 
what constitutes a green economy, environmental communicators face a situation 
characterized by discursive confusion as the complexity of natural capital accounting 
processes conceal new political configurations. Counter-movements argue that the 
green economy program is performing ideological work that uses the language of the 
environmentalism to obscure an intensified agenda of neoliberal governance and capital 
accumulation. The concept now has contradictory meanings. Environmental 
communicators have an important role to play in exposing the contested nature of the 
project and in helping to define the emerging green economy. 
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The green economy project was launched June 2012 at Rio+20 by the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) with their flagship document titled Towards a Green 
Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication (2011). The 
project presents itself as a far-reaching program of reform. While the rhetoric suggests 
that the UN is serious about addressing the biodiversity crisis, green economists and a 
wide variety of social movements were less convinced by the proposed policy 
mechanisms. Civil society responded at Rio+20 with a plethora of critical responses: 
condemning what they claimed amounted to the corporate capture of the United Nations 
(UN) (Joint Civil Society Statement, 2012); condemning the  “Natural Capital 
Declaration” (Banktrack, 2012); condemning 20 years of Greenwash (Bruno, 2012); 
and indeed, condemning the entire green economy project (Nadal, 2012; Brand, 2012a; 
Patel & Crook, 2012). The Indigenous People’s Global Conference on Rio+20 and 
Mother Earth (2012) issued a strongly worded “Kari-Oca 2 Declaration” (2012) 
describing UNEP’s green economy as “a continuation of colonialism” (p. 1) and firmly 
rejecting market-based solutions, REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
forest Degradation) and intellectual property rights over genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge. In the wake of the polarized positions at Rio+20, the conference 
ended with both civil society and the UN unimpressed with the outcomes. The New 
York Times claimed Rio+20 “ended here as it began, under a shroud of withering 
criticism” (Romero & Broder, 2012); The Guardian’s headline read: “Rio+20 outcome a 
focal point for frustration among campaigners” (Ford, 2012); and the Financial Times 
announced “Rio+20 lacks ambition, says UN chief” (Clark, 2012). The conference 
failed to achieve binding targets but more significantly the conference launched 
UNEP’s green economy project which aims to redesign the processes through which the 
global commons will be managed. What is noteworthy about this is the degree to which 
environmental language is used to advance a project that is ideologically antithetical to 
many of the environmental movement’s basic premises. UNEP’s green economy is a 
fiercely contested concept rejected by indigenous groups, social movements and NGOs 
concerned with both environmental conservation and environmental justice.  
In naming its program the “green economy”, UNEP and partners imply a 
reframing of the entire economy along green lines. The language even suggests a 
connection to a particular school of economic thought concerned with the environment, 
that of green economics. However, the program itself reflects policy prescriptions of 
other schools of economic thinking on the environment, namely environmental 
economics and to a lesser degree, ecological economics. Since green economics is a 
field with very different policy prescriptions to what is proposed, the naming of the new 
project creates a situation characterized by discursive confusion. In this paper, the 
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“green economy project” will be referred to as “GEP” to avoid confusion with what 
green economists have been describing as “green economics” for at least fifteen years.  
This paper will examine the development of the concept of a green economy and 
situate the GEP in relation to different economic approaches to the environment. It will 
compare various types of green economic theory and demonstrate how the GEP blurs 
these distinctions. In an attempt to clarify competing discourses it will examine specific 
philosophical, methodological, and political problems with the GEP. It will also reflect 
on risks and suggest strategies for communicating the contested nature of the GEP 
proposal. While the GEP is in the process of becoming hegemonic (in the UK 
especially), “there is as yet no agreed definition of what constitutes a green economy” 
(Stakeholders Forum, 2012, paragraph 1). It is possible to describe the ideological 
framework of the GEP and a few of the ways in which this idea has been developed, as 
described in the “Towards a Green Economy” UNEP report (2011) for example. The 
GEP project has many aspects (agriculture, water, forests, fisheries, renewable energy, 
manufacturing, waste, buildings, transport, tourism, cities) and policy recommendations 
vary for each. Analysis of the specific policy proposals for any these sectors is beyond 
the scope of this paper which will focus on the ideological work that buttresses the 
project, the ways in which this ideology is being presented as if it were neutral, and 
associated communication issues.   
Since the green economy is still being defined, environmental communication 
plays a key role in constructing what is understood as a green economy while also 
drawing attention to the power dynamics, motivations and economic interests of 
institutional actors. An example of this work exposing corporate power and the GEP is 
the “Who will Control the Green Economy?” (2011) report by the ETC Group (Action 
Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration). The GEP relies on the use of 
environmental language and concepts such as “green economy”, “natural capital” and 
“ecosystem services”. Environmental communicators are in a good position to clarify 
the providence of these terms and reveal how new meanings are being created.  
 
Introduction to the Green Economy Project 
The GEP is part of a political project wherein environmental decision-making is shifting 
from political governance processes to economistic processes and logic. With this 
change, environmental concerns, concepts and language are used to describe policy 
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agendas where markets determine environmental priorities. Despite the green rhetoric, 
critics claim that the GEP will give more control and power to the corporate and the 
financial sectors to manage nature through natural capital accounting processes. Thus in 
stark opposition to what green economists have traditionally conceived of as the green 
economy, with its emphasis on democratic decision-making, the GEP moves 
environmental decision-making out of the public sphere and into the marketplace. 
Decisions about the environment will be made by those with the capital to participate in 
these markets. 
While undoubtedly most scientists and environmentalists involved with the GEP 
aim to find a means of helping/making political and economic actors to acknowledge 
the value of the environment, submitting nature to the logic of the market (and the 
financial industry) is an extraordinarily dangerous enterprise. Instead, green economic 
theory asserts that the economic system must submit to the logic of the ecological 
systems that provides the geophysical context for economic systems to exist in the first 
place. By using the term “green economics” the GEP obscures the differences between 
different ways of managing the ecological commons, i.e. a natural commons based 
approach (i.e. green economics) versus a natural capital based approach (i.e. 
environmental economics). This obscuring process is probably not, in the vast majority 
of cases, a deliberate strategy by the individuals involved. Environmentalists working 
on the GEP are disillusioned with the current approach (which is clearly not working to 
protect biodiversity) and see the project as a means of securing funding for conservation 
(Newey, 2014). Yet vested interests are masked behind a politics that insists that the 
market is a neutral playing field.  
The GEP aims to protect nature by accounting for externalities of environmental 
damage. According to this logic, once nature’s processes are given a financial value, 
prices of goods and services will reflect ecological costs and it will no longer make 
economic sense to produce ecologically harmful products or degrade environmental 
spaces. The project relies on the assumption that nature’s processes can be safely 
disaggregated and effectively managed using natural capital accounting. While there are 
other elements of the GEP (some of which are commendable), this paper focuses on the 
monetarization and market-making policy prescriptions. The financial valuation policies 
are the most significant aspect of the program since other proposals will be subordinated 
to the economic logic of these modes of governance. Ultimately, the GEP relies on the 
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private sector for investment and in exchange for capital investment ownership and 
control will be granted to private corporations and financial institutions. A whole new 
range of financial products will be created based on “natural capital”. This will create 
lucrative opportunities for the financial sector with new markets for speculation. 
Expectations of profits will drive these new markets while environmental rhetoric 
provides convenient green marketing and public relations messaging to conceal 
continued – and indeed amplified unsustainable development.  
 
Etymology of the green economy, natural capital and ecosystem services 
The term “green economy” was first coined in the Blueprint for a Green Economy 
(1989) report by Pearce, Markandya, and Barbier (Allen & Clouth, 2012, p. 7). In a 
paper titled “Green economy – The next oxymoron? No lessons learned from failures of 
implementing sustainable development” Brand (2012b) claims that “the concept of a 
green economy is, like sustainable development, rather an oxymoron which intends to 
bundle different, partly contradictory, interests and strategies and gives them a certain 
legitimacy and coherence” (p.2). The project is an amalgamation of conflicting agendas. 
On the one hand, it is a desperate attempt by scientists and environmentalists to 
convince industrialists and politicians to prioritize environmental concerns. On the other 
hand, it is the recognition by business of opportunities for profit in the creation of new 
green markets. The first section of UNEP’s report (2011) is titled “From crisis to 
opportunity”.  The word “opportunity” is used 87 times throughout the document. In the 
context of the GEP, the notion of new business opportunities refers to new profits 
derived, to a substantial degree, from a new model of private ownership of the natural 
commons. This process will be facilitated by governments who in some cases (the UK) 
are already creating the infrastructure to sell the rights to the environment under the 
pretext that by conceptualizing the non-human natural world as natural capital corporate 
executives will be motivated to make responsible decisions. 
The GEP has emerged from the development of the two foundational concepts: “natural 
capital” and “ecosystem services”. Figure One illustrates the relationship between 
ecosystem science, ecosystem services, and ecosystem markets by illustrating the role 
of capital in the intellectual construction of this framework. The two concepts are 
examined below. 
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Figure 1. The Theory of Natural Capital and Ecosystem Services © EcoLabs (2014). 
 
Natural capital 
E.F. Schumacher first used the concept of natural capital in his book Small Is Beautiful 
(1973, p. 2). Sullivan (2013b) describes the current meaning of the concept of natural 
capital as having its origins in the formation of the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) at the first Rio United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) Earth Summit in 1992. In a popular 1994 
speech, WBCSD’s Maurice Strong said, “addressing the challenge of achieving global 
sustainability, we must apply the basic principles of business. This means running 
‘Earth Incorporated’ with a depreciation, amortization and maintenance account” 
(Strong, paragraph 42). The concept of natural capital gained popularity in business 
circles as a way of thinking about environmental governance and was encouraged by 
environmentalists such as Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins, Hunter Lovins and Jonathan 
Porritt. Now, four decades since the concept was first coined, the idea has 
metamorphosed. The notion of nature as natural capital, and as equivalent to capital in 
the bank, is being adopted by national governments. In 2011, UK Environment Minister 
Caroline Spelman launched the report “The natural choice: Securing the value of 
nature” with the statement, “…if we withdraw something from Mother Nature’s Bank, 
we’ve got to put something back to ensure that the environment has a healthy balance 
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and a secure future” (paragraph 8). In 2012 the UK established a Natural Capital 
Committee and economists began “preparing to include a value for ‘natural capital’ in 
Britain’s GDP calculations by 2020, a move that promises to be the greatest change in 
national accounting practices since their creation 70 years ago” (Whipple, 2012, 
paragraph 2). Meanwhile, at an international level, the Bank of Natural Capital website 
was launched in 2011 by The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) 
project, a project supported by the UN  and European Union (EU). Within the Bank of 
Natural Capital “nature’s stocks and flows are depicted such that they accord with the 
format of a standard online current bank account” (Sullivan, 2013b, paragraph 13). 
Nature’s processes are reduced to capital that can be traded like other financial 
instruments.  
This conceptualization of the natural world as natural capital has deep reaching 
implications. Sullivan (2013b) describes natural capital as involving four types of shifts: 
a discursive shift; a material shift; a calculative and accounting shift; and an institutional 
shift. This kind of comprehensive treatment would be commendable if the management 
of economic affairs was to be changed in keeping with the needs and logic of ecological 
processes. Instead, the management of environmental issues will be conducted using 
economic logic and financial instruments. The concept of natural capital gained traction 
at Rio+20 where 40 CEOs of banks, investors and insurers signed the “Natural Capital 
Declaration”, launched by UNEP’s Finance Initiative. This project has been gaining 
strength, especially in the UK, a nation whose economy is heavily dependent on the 
financial industry. The World Forum on Natural Capital was held in Edinburgh in 
November 2013 (see below). 
 
Ecosystem services 
The concept of an ecosystem was first used in 1935 by Arthur Tansley. The theory of 
ecosystem services was not used until the 1980s and 1990s (Costanza et al., 1997; 
Dempsey & Roberston, 2012) and not formalized until the publication of the United 
Nations 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Today applications of the concept: 
“include its use as a communication tool, for policy guidance and priority setting, and 
for designing economic instruments for conservation” (Luck et al., 2012, p.1020). There 
are four types of ecosystem services: provisioning services (producing food, fuel, and 
fiber); regulation services (the maintenance of the climate, regulation of floods and 
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diseases, biological control of pest populations, pollination of crops, and filtration and 
purification of water); cultural services (benefits to science such as pharmaceutical 
products or spiritual, educational, and recreational benefits); and supporting services 
enabling all the above (nutrient cycling and the creation of soil, etc.) (DEFRA, 2007). 
The concept of ecosystem services is a powerful idea that covers all kinds of natural 
processes.  
While the concept of ecosystem services can be a useful learning tool, the 
reduction of ecology into services that are helpful to humans instrumentalizes ecological 
relations. This becomes a problem especially when ecosystem services are used as a 
component of market processes as opposed to the context in which markets are enabled 
to exist. Today's largest ecosystem services market is the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) designed to reduce carbon emission. Lohmann (2011) describes how the 
ecosystem service concept has been used here: “the first step was to simplify and 
quantify the ecological functions in question, so that standardized increments of 
‘environmental improvement’ could be traded for standardized bits of ‘environmental 
destruction’” (p. 2). Unfortunately, gross carbon emissions have not been reduced by 
the EU ETS, although it has worked to enable polluting industries to profit from selling 
permits (Gilbertson & Reyes, 2009). Within the GEP, the concept of ecosystem services 
facilitates the creation of markets for a wide variety of ecological processes, but the 
example of the EU ETS does not bode well for the use of market mechanisms as a 
means of protecting the natural world. Lohmann (2012) claims climate negotiations 
have been derailed by monetization and financialization and asserts that this same 
strategy is now being applied to biodiversity loss with the GEP. 
Both natural capital and ecosystem services can be understood as what Brendon 
Larson describes as feedback metaphors in environmental sciences. A feedback 
metaphor “harbours social values [that] circulate back into society to bolster those very 
values” (Larson, 2011, p. 22). These two concepts emphasize an instrumental, utilitarian 
and fragmenting approach to the natural world. While they function well within 
neoliberal modes of governance, this way of understanding the natural world is deeply 
problematic. Both concepts reinforce a perspective wherein the environment is reduced 
to a part of the economic system. As powerful metaphors functioning as part of the 
GEP, these ideas threatens to transform our relationship to the non-human natural world 
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by asserting that clean air, water, and habitats for endangered species are privileges 
(Adams, 1996, p.100) rather than a commons that all of humanity shares. 
 
Varieties of Economic Approaches to the Environment 
Environmental economics, ecological economics, green economics and eco-socialist 
economics are distinct discourses with different conceptualizations of the relationship 
between the environment and the economy. They have different policy prescriptions 
that relate especially to the degree to which they believe market mechanisms can help 
with the management of environmental problems. All too often economics in 
conservation discourses is conflated with the ideological assumptions of neoliberalism 
(Buscher et al., 2012, p.5), as if this is only type of economic policy is that is viable.  
The GEP follows the theory of environmental economics (such as David Pearce) 
and, to a lesser extent, ecological economics (such as Robert Costanza). It attempts to 
preserve biodiversity by factoring environmental externalities into economics, creating 
processes for valuation and trading of two particular externalities: destruction and 
pollution. Environmental economics uses market mechanisms and valuation as a 
corollary of “normal” economics and values things, including ecosystems, in monetary 
terms. Both environmental and ecological economics attempt to account for the 
geophysical context by using the concept of environmental externalities. Ecological 
valuation processes enable environmental and ecological economics to use market-
based mechanisms as a means of decision-making for the environment. It is worth 
noting that monetary valuation of nature is still contested by some prominent ecological 
economists. For example, Herman Daly recently (2013) updated an earlier paper with 
the statement: 
Witness economists’ attempts to value species by asking consumers how 
much they would be willing to pay to save a threatened species, or how 
much they would accept in compensation for the species’ disappearance. 
The fact that the two methods of this “contingent valuation” give different 
answers only adds comic relief to the underlying tragedy, which is the 
reduction of value to taste weighted by income (paragraph 13). 
While monetization processes are contested within the field of ecological economics, 
green economics rejects the monetization of nature entirely. Green economics also 
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opposes the use of the concept of environmental externalities and the notion of 
substitutability. 
Green economics is distinct from the GEP. According to green economists, both 
environmental and ecological economics make too many concessions to the reductive 
logic of neoclassical and neoliberal economics. Green economists such as Molly Scott 
Cato, Mary Mellor, Hazel Henderson, Richard Douthwaite, James Robertson, and 
Andrew Simms treat the environment as the overarching system and one that is best 
understood as a commons. In Green Economics: An Introduction to Theory, Policy and 
Practice, Cato (2009) explains that while “green economists accept many of the 
theoretical conclusions of the ecological economists, especially the importance of 
ending economic growth and developing a steady-state economy” (p. 206), they reject 
the neoclassical/environmental economics concept of an “externality”. The logic of 
attempting to make capitalism sustainable by accounting for ecological externalities is 
dubious according to green economic theory. The UN’s own data indicates that none of 
the world’s top industrial sectors would be profitable if environmental costs were fully 
integrated (Roberts 2013, paragraph 11).  
  
Figure 2. Economic Approaches to the Environment © EcoLabs (2014).  
Both ecological and green economists reject the GDP metric as a means of measuring 
the wellbeing of a nation’s economy and both aim to redefine economic prosperity in a 
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manner that emphasizes qualitative not quantitative growth (Capra & Henderson, 2009; 
Jackson, 2009). Ecological economics supports new metrics, often advocating the 
Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) ( Kubiszewski et al., 2013) while green economics 
aims for qualitative assessment of economic progress that cannot be reduced to a single 
quantitative metric. Green economics is committed to the primacy of intrinsic value in 
organizing economic relations, where the objective is the meeting of need rather than 
generating profit. Green economics rejects the concept of substitutability (the idea that a 
particular ecosystem can be substituted and accounted for by saving another ecosystem 
elsewhere).The chart in Figure Two clarifies some of the key differences between 
various economic approaches to the environment.  
 
 
Problems for Environmental Communicators 
These divergent definitions of green economy create a serious dilemma for 
environmental communicators. The task of communicating a set of policy initiatives 
proposed by the UNEP that are closely related to a neoliberal market liberalization 
agenda under the banner of the “green economy” creates confusion within 
environmental discourses. Counter-movements claim that the obscuring rhetoric of the 
GEP serves the interests of those who want increased free-markets and continued 
unsustainable development without the interference of environmental regulations. The 
predicament for environmental communicators is profound. On one hand, there is a 
need to refer to the GEP by its name – yet the name itself appropriates the language of 
green economists, thereby creating a discursive obfuscation of the actual policy agenda. 
Green economists aim to reclaim the concept of a green economy, but in doing so they 
face the challenge of appearing to support the GEP. Meanwhile scientists and social 
scientists are busy helping develop the conceptual, scientific, and institutional 
infrastructure that will support the transition to the GEP. This section will look at 
philosophical, methodological and political problems associated with the GEP.  
 
Philosophical Issues  
The GEP re-imagines the global commons in a manner that demonstrates a 
misunderstanding of levels in ecological theory. Environmental and ecological 
economics hold that natural capital brings the environment onto the balance books of 
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industry. For environmental economists, “the environment’s first role… is as a supplier 
of resources” (Hanley, Shogren & White, 2007, p. 3) and they understand nature as a 
subsystem of the economy (McAfee, 2012, p.109). This conceptualization is erroneous. 
The environment is not only a supplier of resources, but it is the geophysical context 
that makes the idea of resources even possible. Ecological economists recognize this 
concept in theory, but in practice they also reduce the environment to part of the 
economic system. This error is manifested throughout the new project. The global 
ecological commons are the source of life and the basis for all activities – economic and 
non-economic. Economics is a construct made possible by ecological processes. 
Ecological processes are simply too complex to be captured absolutely through financial 
valuation processes because they are the context of economics, not a subsystem of 
economics (as visualized in Figure Three). The GEP is premised on the epistemological 
error that assumes the economic system is of greater importance than the ecological 
system on which the economy depends. It is no small thing to bring nature into the 
space where everything must prove its financial worth (which is not possible for 
methodological and political reasons described below). Ecological systems are not 
fragmented, but are complex webs of interconnected and interdependent relations that 
cannot be effectively understood, much less managed in isolation. Reducing the value 
of nature to financial terms is an epistemological shift that facilitates exploitation in a 
material realm. Counter-movements argue that conceptions of the natural world as 
subject to the logic of the market are a prelude to the sale of those environments that are 
desired by industry for development.  
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Figure 3. Conceptions of Human-Natural Relations: Hierarchy of Systems © EcoLabs (2014).  
 
Methodological Issues 
Philosophical errors spawn further methodological problems in the quantification and 
monetization of nature’s processes. Methodological problems include the limits of 
scientific capacities to value nature’s various processes; the consistent undervaluation of 
ecosystem services; the underestimation of risk; the issue of substitutability; and issues 
of communication and motivation. Humankind simply does not have the scientific 
capacity to measure all of the life-sustaining services provided by nature but what is 
obvious (to those with even basic ecological literacy) is that there will be no financial 
system to create wealth without the benefit of a stable climate, clean water and healthy 
local ecosystems. When scientists do fix a price for nature, these values are often 
absurdly low, illustrating the practical consequences of logical and epistemological 
errors. This problem has been evident since Costanza et al. described the average value 
of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital as $33trillion/year in 1997 (p.253). 
While the authors of this seminar paper acknowledge the fact the “economies of the 
earth would grind to a halt without the services of ecological life support systems” and 
that there “the many conceptual and empirical problems inherent in producing such an 
estimate” (p.253), the low valuation set a precedent that has plagued the financialization 
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agenda. Clearly Costanza et al. aimed to create a means to prioritize environmental 
concerns. Unfortunately, within the context of neoliberalization of modes of 
governance, even strong environmental concepts are appropriated and transformed into 
new means to support capital accumulation (in this case by obscuring human-nature 
relations with natural capital accounting processes).  
 More recently, “The economics of ecosystems and biodiversity (TEEB)” (2010) 
report uses the estimate of €153 billion ($205bn USD) as the total economic value of 
insect pollination worldwide (p. 8). It is a high number, but does this number actually 
reflect the value of pollinating insects? Considering that our existence is entirely 
dependent on ecosystem services – and pollinating insects that are a vital part of these 
ecosystems – it follows that insects are worth more than a small percentage of the value 
of total global production (GGDP). Similarly, the Prince’s Foundation Accounting for 
Sustainability Project (2011) published an image that inverts the hierarchy of the 
relationship between economy and ecology (see Figure Four). This project aims to make 
a case for sustainability and yet the numbers distort and misrepresent the relationship 
between the economic and ecological system.  
 
Figure 4. Costing the Earth © [Information is Beautiful Studio] (2011). London: The Prince’s Accounting 
for Sustainability.  
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While the numbers lend an aura of authority to environmental debates, they fail 
to establish a truthful framing of humankind’s dependence on the natural world. At the 
World Forum on Natural Capital in Edinburgh, Scotland’s First Minister Alex Salmond 
claimed that nature is worth between £21.5 to £23 billion per year to the Scottish 
economy (World Forum on Natural Capital, 2013, paragraph 7). The valuation is 
diminutive. Scotland’s economy is entirely dependent on the relative stability and 
provisioning services provided by the environment. When Friends of the Earth UK 
designed their campaign to protect bees, they used the figure of £1.8 billion ($2.8bn 
USD) as the financial value of bees in the UK. Again the numbers represent a reduction 
of complexity in complex ecosystems and fail to account for the fact that ecological 
systems have tipping points that trigger abrupt changes and even collapse.  
Furthermore, the monetization of nature encourages the underestimation of risk. 
While market processes give the “impression that humankind can control nature as 
‘assets’ so as to have the possibility to ‘bail out’ earth systems when they break down” 
(Fioramonti, 2013, p. 118), once ecological thresholds are passed money cannot fix 
extinct species, collapsed ecosystems, climate change, etc.. Financial valuation 
processes reward ignorance on issues of risk since knowledge and value have a 
corollary relationship, i.e. the higher the level of knowledge of the risks of ecologically 
damaging activity, the higher the value assigned to ecosystems in cost-benefit analysis 
(Adams 1996, p.108). Thus financial valuation methodology actually encourages 
greater ecologically illiteracy as it rewards the denial of risks (by under-valuing 
ecological spaces and species). Ultimately, the numbers have more to do with politics 
and power than the value of a particular ecosystem service.  
Even if financial valuation processes were to give ecosystem services high 
monetary value, market-making processes remains inherently problematic due to the 
assumption of substitutability. Ecosystem markets generate the conditions for 
development and ruin of individual ecosystem services with the pretext that others will 
be conserved. With this formulation, the GEP assumes that animals, forests and a stable 
climate, etc. are somehow replaceable by the wizardry of financial markets. The non-
human natural world is reconceptualized as natural capital that will be conserved (in 
order to provide ecosystem services), or sold to enable development (and ensuing 
ecological degradation). This project does create opportunities for business at first, but 
once destroyed an ecosystem cannot be fixed or saved by other preserved ecosystems 
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elsewhere. Net ecosystem services are diminished. 
A final set of methodological problems pertains to communication, identity and 
psychological motivations. Motivational crowding out theory (Vatn, 2000, 2010) 
describes how motivation for environmental conservation is impacted by utilitarian 
logic that risks “eroding noneconomic incentives for environmental stewardship” (Luck 
et al., 2012, p.1024). The Common Cause project on motivation in strategies for change 
describes the ways in which human identity and values are encouraged or discouraged 
through social practices and communication. Framing the environment in monetary 
terms has profound implications for human-nature relations since it impacts human 
motivation and agency for change making. Psychological and communication 
researchers describe how the financial valuation of nature encourages extrinsic values 
(those centered on external approval or rewards, values such as seeking social status) 
resulting in a simultaneous erosion of intrinsic values (those that are inherently 
rewarding, values such as benevolence) (Crompton & Kasser, 2009; Common Cause, 
2014, paragraph 12). Campaigning strategists allege that the utilitarian mindset 
established by quantification processes pushes out intrinsic values and the strong 
attachments to nature that have traditionally driven pro-environmental behavior 
(Crompton, 2013). Cognitive scientists, including George Lakoff (2009), have 
demonstrated the limitation of quantitative, utilitarian and exclusively rational modes of 
reasoning in motivation on politicized issues. George Monbiot (2014) summarizes 
Lakoff’s position and describes why it matters for the ways in which we frame human-
nature relations:  
…you cannot win an argument unless you expound your own values and 
reframe the issue around them. If you adopt the language and values of your 
opponents “you lose because you are reinforcing their frame.” Costing 
nature tells us that it possesses no inherent value; that it is worthy of 
protection only when it performs services for us; that it is replaceable. You 
demoralise and alienate those who love the natural world while reinforcing 
the values of those who don’t. 
For Monbiot and other critics of the GEP, environmentalists who accept the economic 
framing and monetization of nature are “stepping into a trap their opponents have set” 
(Monbiot, 2014). This framing of the environment establishes a feedback metaphor that 
reinforces the epistemological error described earlier.  
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Political Issues   
Political problems with the GEP include its ruin of democratic participation in 
environmental decision-making and risks associated with the neoliberalization of 
environmental policy. Evidence of the democratic failure of the project was evident at 
Rio+20 where indigenous communities, social movements and NGOs objected to the 
exclusion of their voices from the GEP policy-making processes. With new ecosystem 
services markets, democratic control of development agendas will be even more 
difficult as markets become the spaces where environmental decisions are made. Those 
making decisions will be those with the financial capacities to participate. Ecosystem 
services markets can be understood as new means of producing profit (for those with 
financial capital) from activities that were otherwise not managed through commodity 
relationship – and a new wave of privatization of the commons.  
A growing body of literature on neoliberalization of nature describes its 
characteristics: financialization, marketization, privatization, deregulation and 
reregulation (Sullivan 2013a; Arsel & Buscher 2012; Böhm, Misoczky & Moog, 2012; 
Castree, 2008a). Additionally, methods of governmentality are being implemented 
wherein complexity replaces responsibility and where governments outsource 
responsibilities for regulation (Castree, 2008a; Peck, 2010). While rolling-back 
responsibilities of the state, neoliberal governments simultaneously roll-out other types 
of state functions, creating an “explosion of ‘market conforming’ regulatory incursions” 
(Peck, 2010, p. 23). Within a neoliberal context, government policy works to facilitate 
market processes rather than attend to social or environmental priorities. The 
relationship between the global economic and financial crises and the emerging GEP 
has been described in depth by Lohmann (2011, 2012), Sullivan (2012, 2013a), Nadal 
(2012), Arsel and Buscher (2012) and Food and Water Europe (2012, 2013). According 
its critics, the GEP is supported by the corporate and financial sectors because they 
recognize the program an expansion of the scope of market, an intensification of the 
neoliberal model and an exceptional opportunity to create new financial instruments 
based on a new type of capital. The GEP also establishes new markets for financial 
speculation.  
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Recent history has seen a transformation in modern capitalism characterized by 
the rise of financialization, i.e. the increasing importance of “financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the 
domestic and international economies” (Epstein, 2005, p. 3). While the last economic 
crisis, estimated to cost governments globally at least $12 trillion (Conway, 2009), 
demonstrated the fallibility of the financial sector, the GEP brings the logic of 
financialization to the management of nature. The activist slogan “nature does not to 
bailouts” responses to this dilemma.  
In recent decades market forces have come to exert enormous influence in 
environmental policy and conservation. The GEP intensifies this trend. Brand and 
Vardot describe how epistemic selectivities, i.e. “mechanisms inscribed in political 
institutions which privilege particular forms of knowledge, problem perceptions, and 
narrative over others” (2013, p.218) are now working toward the valorization of nature, 
or “the appropriation of nature for its marketing” (p.209). Here instrumental and 
utilitarian logic is used to privilege economic values, submit nature to this logic and 
then conceal continued unsustainable development by marketing the process as a green 
project. Political possibilities outside of market-based options are not considered. The 
power grab that occurred during the last financial crisis has put the corporate and 
financial sectors in a strong position to push forward this agenda. 
Critics of the GEP claim that its financial valuation and market-creating work 
creates opportunities for investors to extract greater profit from the management of 
nature while simultaneously weakening the capacity of political institutions to stop 
destructive development, especially where governance processes are weaker than 
market forces. There will be money to be made in new markets but the act of creating 
markets for natural capital also establishes conditions for natural spaces to be sold. The 
work of environmental and social scientists supporting the GEP gives scientific 
authority to the project, but the important decisions will have already been determined. 
Once the ideological work has been done and mechanisms are established to substitute 
one ecosystem service for another, this approach provides a means to legitimize the 
development of critical ecological sites. For example, UK Environment Minister Owen 
Paterson used the concept of biodiversity offsetting to justify the destruction of old 
growth forests, with the promise that 100 new trees will be planted for each ancient tree 
destroyed (The Guardian, 2014, paragraphs 3-4).  
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Critics claim that the GEP is a deepening commitment to the neoliberal political 
project (Buscher et al., 2012; Dempsey & Robertson, 2012; Lohmann, 2012; Nadal, 
2012; Brand, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Brand & Vadrot, 2013). Herein “the subordination 
of social and environmental considerations to macroeconomic policy imperatives” is 
normalized (Nadal, 2012, p. 15). Once “macroeconomic objectives are determined, 
every other policy target is chiseled in accordance” (Nadal, 2012, p. 15). For those who 
have internalized this logic, there appears to be no alternative. Neoliberalism is 
characterized by the elevation of market-based principles and techniques of governance 
to state-endorsed norms (Peck, 2013). This ideology is becoming entrenched in politics 
and has enabled a dramatic concentration in capital over the past three decades, 
documented in global wealth and inequality reports (Fuentes-Nieva & Galasso, 2014). 
The new political configuration and the lack of regulation have enabled widespread land 
grabbing and green grabbing (Fairhead, Leach & Scoones, 2012). Ideology laden policy 
proposals such as the GEP claim to be politically neutral (UNEP, 2011, p.7) but 
powerful interests are concealed behind the pretense of the inevitable expansion of 
capitalist logic, i.e. markets as a means of organizing ever-increasing domains of human 
existence. Politics that presents itself as non-political (Castree, 2008a, p.143, citing 
Beck, 2000, p.122) works to naturalize and obscure the interests behind dramatic new 
political reconfigurations, now using the green economy as one of the most powerful 
concepts to legitimize an intensified neoliberal political project. The discursive 
confusion resulting from the use of environmental language to describe a project of 
market expansion, privatization, neoliberal governance and even violent dispossession 
serves the interests of those who would not like these dynamics to be clear and who 
would also like to appear to be doing the right thing by the environment, without 
disturbing business as usual. 
 
Developments since Rio+20 
Since Rio+20 the GEP project has been developed by UNEP, the UK government, the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development, TEEB for Business Coalition 
and other institutional and organizational actors. While some of this work sets out to 
help business understand the environmental consequences of their activities, the project 
continues to be fiercely contested. The World Forum on Natural Capital in Edinburgh in 
November 2013 was a recent site for ideological and discursive contestation. The event 
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described an urgent need for action. Like at Rio+20, based solely on the marketing 
rhetoric, it appeared to be the type of integrated project environmental movements have 
attempted to create for decades. The glaring exception was the conference’s major 
sponsor, the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), a bank heavily invested in the Canadian 
Tar Sands project. As the conference progressed the ways in which natural capital 
accounting can function as a means to greenwash corporate practice became apparent. 
For example, a representative of mining company Rio Tinto described how natural 
capital accounting helped  them manage their environmental impact. This prompted 
World Development Movement director Nick Dearden to tweet: “Now #RioTinto is? 
telling us about their net positive impact on the world. That's the beauty of natural 
capital.” (@nickdearden75, 2013). Counter movements claim that natural capital 
accounting also sets the stage for environmental spaces to be sold, a fact that is also 
recognized by some in the financial industry. Neil Brown, a fund manager and speaker 
for a session on the role of the financial sector stated: “Once you put a price on nature in 
order to protect it, you may find someone willing to pay slightly more in order to 
destroy it” (quoted in CounterBalance, 2013, paragraph 7).  
Environmental justice groups protested outside the “The World Forum on 
Natural Capital” conference and organized a counter-conference called “Nature is Not 
for Sale: Forum on the Natural Commons”. This second event highlighted alternative 
means of managing the ecological commons, i.e. “food sovereignty, community energy, 
remunicipalise water. Less finance, more regulation” (@nickdearden75, 2013b). A 
declaration called “No to Biodiversity Offsetting” signed by 150 global organizations 
was launched. Organizers of the counter-conference exposed the contradictions with the 
GEP project both at the conference (which as streamed online) and with the Twitter 
hashtag #natureforsale. 
These two Edinburgh events shed light on the tensions and stratification between 
the discourses of “natural commons” versus those of “natural capital”. The Forum on 
the Natural Commons used the commons as the point of reference to resist the 
expansion of market-based environmental decision-making and the reduction of nature 
to a new form of capital. The World Forum on Natural Capital used the rhetoric and 
ideology of necessity to attempt to transcend politics and replace accountability with the 
obscuring complexity of natural capital accounting processes. Scientists and 
environmentalists are needed to manage complexity and the GEP has proponents in the 
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environmental community who see possibilities for new environmental funding 
schemes. Critics argue that the GEP works primarily to leave corporations to self-
regulate, with new tools to conceal continued polluting activities. Rather than holding 
polluters accountable, natural capital processes give polluters more powerful means to 
greenwash their activities with “net biodiversity” gains and the ability to buy the rights 
to natural capital. Since the natural commons are already been used by local (often 
indigenous) communities, natural capital accounting creates new mechanisms for land 
and green grabbing. For example, tropical forests are now valued as a potential for 
carbon storage, biofuel production, a source of REDD funding and as a source of global 
conservation funding and/or biodiversity offsetting. Those with the financial capital to 
invest in natural capital (i.e. these forests) all too often do not recognize the rights of 
indigenous people to share the natural commons. Evictions and dispossessions are a 
result (Fairhead, Leach & Scoones, 2012).  
  
Strategies for Environmental Communication 
Green economist and politician Molly Scott Cato (2012) calls on environmental 
movements to resist the appropriation and redefinition of the term green economy. The 
problem then becomes: how do environmental communicators even describe the GEP 
project? The UN is attempting to define a financial valuation program as the green 
economy. Clearly  it has greater resources to establish cultural legitimacy than relatively 
marginalized green economists and social movements without such significant 
institutional support. The confusion is already leading to incoherent public discourses. 
The rhetorical devices environmental communicators have at their disposal have 
become contaminated with contradictory meanings. The results are very confusing even 
for seasoned professionals. It is difficult to talk about a green economy when this 
expression is used to refer to two entirely different types of deliberations on the 
commons with contradictory policy proposals. This paper has tactically refused to call 
the GEP the green economy as a means of differentiating different discourses. 
Environmental communicators in sympathy with green economists can clumsily deal 
with this problem by adding “false” or “so-called” in front of every instance of the GEP 
– but this is a defensive tactic rather than a long-term strategy.   
Those of us involved with communicating the interests of the environment must 
clarify competing discourses, support democratic processes and describe GEP policies 
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along with associated risks. Counter movements are exposing these dynamics, yet these 
critiques remain marginal. Following the analysis presented in this paper, recommended 
communication strategies are listed here: 
• challenge the undervaluation of nature in natural capital accounting 
• clarify the different policy agendas of the GEP and those of green economics 
• expose the dangers of prioritizing economic profit over environmental conservation 
• expose mechanisms which create opportunities for profit, but have ecological risks 
• expose closures of deliberations and encourage democratic processes  
• expose obfuscation tactics and challenge greenwashing  
• expose the appropriation of the language of environmental movements and reclaim it 
• engage with a political analysis of the neoliberalization of the environment 
• support social movements in their work to describe and build viable alternatives 
• support communities impacted by land and green grabbing as a result of the GEP  
• draw attention to the violence struggles that emerge in the context of the GEP  
Longer-term strategies include building capacity for greater critical ecological literacy 
so as to enable more profound analysis of environmental problems and the politics that 
perpetuate weak approaches to sustainable development. Clearly there are alternatives. 
The BankTrack statement released at Rio+20 proposes: 
…instead of expanding the scope of markets to every domain of nature, creating a 
true green economy would start from the opposite; reversing the tide of 
commodification and financialization, reducing the role of markets and the 
financial sector, acknowledging the limits of business versus other spheres of life, 
and recognizing the collective responsibility of all people for, and strengthening 
the democratic control over the worlds' ecological commons (2012, p.1). 
There is important work to be done in clarifying competing discourses and making it 
apparent that there are other models for managing the natural commons. 
 
Conclusion 
None of the above should be read to imply that the vast majority of scientists, ecological 
or environmental economists and others working on the GEP are not sincere in their 
intentions to use the project to protect the environment. Unfortunately, their analysis is 
flawed. The GEP is an intensification of the neoliberal political project. It is a new 
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phase in the long trajectory of the enclosures of the common. Social and environmental 
justice campaigners are the first to oppose the GEP because they are aware that 
marginalized communities will feel the immediate impact. The Indigenous People’s 
Kari-Oca 2 Declaration (2012) describes the UN’s GEP as a “continuation of 
colonialism… a perverse attempt by corporations, extractive industries and 
governments to cash in on Creation by privatizing, commodifying and selling off the 
Sacred and all forms of life and the sky” (p.1-2). Re-conceptualizing the entire natural 
commons as natural capital, where this second term is used to describe non-human 
nature as commodities that can be traded, is an extraordinarily dangerous proposition 
for reasons described in this paper.   
The man who first coined the idea of natural capital had strong ideas in regards 
to the use of financial valuation approaches to protect nature. In the same book where 
the term “natural capital” was first published, E.F. Schumacher (1973) wrote: 
To press non-economic values into the framework of the economic Calculus… it is 
a procedure by which the higher is reduced to the level of the lower and the 
priceless is given a price. It can therefore never serve to clarify the situation and 
lead to an enlightened decision. All it can do is lead to self-deception or the 
deception of others; for to undertake to measure the immeasurable is absurd and 
constitutes but an elaborate method of moving from preconceived notions to 
foregone conclusions…The logical absurdity, however, is not the greatest fault of 
the undertaking: what is worse, and destructive of civilization, is the pretence that 
everything has a price or, in other words, that money is the highest of all values. (p. 
27) 
As the concept of natural capital is transformed, the intellectual work of the 
environmental movement is being used to advance a project negating its ideological 
foundations. It is incumbent on environmental movements to distinguish the ways in 
which neoliberalism functions to obscure its own processes by co-opting environmental 
language. In appropriating the most powerful environmental concepts, neutering these 
ideas of their content and then using this language to market political projects that 
support its own aims, the neoliberal political project masks its own dynamics while 
making it appear as if theirs is a green agenda. Revealing the tensions and obfuscations 
on issues of the green economy is a substantial task for those of us who believe we will 
not protect the environment by creating the conditions for it to be sold.  
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